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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from the order of the district court
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action{Tr. 23) following the election of appellant to
stand on his COII;lplaint upon sustaining of a demurrer
thereto. The demurrer (Tr. 18) was based on a failure
to state a cause of action or state a case for injunctive
relief. The order sustaining the demurrer (Tr. 23)
denied the right to amend the complaint and ordered a
dismissal thereof, thus indicating that the ruling of the
court was for failure to state a cause of action for any
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relief whatever. It will therefore be assumed that the
ruling of the court was that the complaint stated grounds
for equitable relief but that it failed to state a cause of
action entitling appellant to any relief whatever.
Since the appeal is on the judgment roll there is
no transcript of evidence. There is, however, a memorandum decision (Tr. 20-22) stating the court's reasons
for sustaining the demurrer of the respondent. The complaint alleges that the action of respondents is violative
of appellants rights of freedom of speech and press, the
right to engage in interstate commerce without interference, that it deprives appellant of his business without due process of law, and of the equal protection of
the laws, and that the ordinance by which respondents
justify their action is discriminatory and unconstitutional.
There follows the complaint, without the title and
verification ( Tr. 1-8) :

Plaintiff complains of defendant·s and for cause of
action alleges as follows:
1. That at all times mentioned herein plaintiff,
Ralph Slater, was doing business as the International
Publishers Service, and as such engaged in business in
the state of Utah and elsewhere. Plaintiff a's such has
filed heretofore with the County Clerk of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, an affidavit of assumed named
in the manner required by Section 58-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff now is and for many years has been
a broker representing various national magazine distributors and publishers, and he is, and at all times
mentioned herein, was. thoroughly qualified personally,
and through agents and employees, to contract and sell
subscriptions to. and to sell, magazines such as INTER:JIOFXT~-\.I~ SPORTS~IAN. GOLFER AND SPORTSM.-\.X, DIXE .-\.~D DANCE, and many other and various
publications.
3. It is the business custom of plaintiff to obtain
and send agents into all the ~states of the Union, soliciting and obtaining subscriptions to the publications in
paragraph 2 hereof mentioned. For over a year last
past, plaintiff doing business as International Publishers
Service, has had permanent headquarters in Los Angeles,
California.
4. For one and one-half years last past, and ;particularly for five weeks last past plaintiff has conducted
his said business using the methods described in this
complaint, and at intervals since 1947 has so conducted
said business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff is willing to pay any la~ful license fees, and to abide by any
lawful regulations, so as to do business in Salt Lake
City. Plaintiff is protected against derilictions of plaintiff's agents and employees by bonds of the WILLIAM
J. BURNS INTERNATIONAL DETECTIVE
AGENCY. It has alwaY's been and will be the policy
of plaintiff to make every effort to assure that the solicitations of magazine subscriptions to the publications
aforesaid are conducted in a quiet, fair and lawful
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manner; and that subscribers are accepted only in the
event they give a definite place of address; and that
said ~subscribers receive that which they contract and
pay to receive.
5. Defendant Salt Lake City now is, and at all
times mentioned herein was, a municipal co~poration
within the State of Utah, and as such duly organized
and incorporated pursuant to the laws of said State of
Utah.
6. Defendant L. C. Crowther, now is, and at all
times mentioned herein was, Chief of Police of said
Salt Lake City; and as such he now is, and at all time's
mentioned herein was, charged with the enforcement,
in said City of the ordinances hereinafter mentioned.
7. The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
passed and enacted an ordinance known as Section 3652
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, parts
of which read as follows :
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
peddle or offer for sale, barter or exchange at
retail, any garden or farm produce, fruits, butter,
eggs, poultry, fish, game, or any other goods,
wares or merchandise whatsoever, or any tickets,
coupons or receipts representing value or redeemable in service, photographs, works of art,
magazine subscriptions, goods or merchandise
whatsoever, in upon or along any street of Salt
Lake City without first obtaining a license so
to do.
"It shall be unlawful for any ;p,erson, under
any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer for
'Sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares
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or n1erchandise whatsoever, in upon or along
any of the following streets, to-wit:
''South Temple street from Second East
street to First 'Yest street: First South street
from Second East street to First West street;
Second South street from Second Enst street to
First \Y est street; Third South street from Second East street to First 'Vest street; Fourth
South street from Second East street to First
'Yest street; State street from First North street
to Fifth South street; Main street from First
X orth street to Fifth South street; and no license
shall be granted to any person to peddle in upon
or along the said streets above described ... , ".
Violations of said ordinances are made punishable
by arrest and imprisonment, under provisions of Section
3718 of the said Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah.
8. Plaintiff now is and has been, engaged on the
public street's and sidewalks in said Salt Lake City, and
in areas, doorways and entranceways immediately abutting thereon, in the business of soliciting and selling,
in a quiet, dignified and peaceful manner, without pressure or undue influence, by and through agents and
employees employed by him for the purpose of selling,
to persons on said places, subscriptions to the magazines and periodicals aforesaid, for future delivery, and
likewise the sale of tangible personal property to be
delivered to the purchasers thereof, or to some other
person, at a subsequent time. Some of the said subscriptions were and will be sent to other states and were and
will be filled by sending into Utah the publications which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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are published in other states. Some of the other subscriptions were and will be filled by sending into other
states the publications which are published in Utah.
The methods of street ~solicitation by ~~laintiff, his
agents and employees, described in this complaint, and
especially as described in this ;paragraph 8 hereof, now
are, and at all the times mentioned in this complaint
were, the major source and the main manner of selling
the property and obtaining subscriptions to the publications mentioned in this complaint, including, among
other, the property and publications mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this complaint. The said methods
of street solicitation now are, and at all the times mentioned in this complaint were, by far, the most effective
method; and, in a great many cases, the only possible
methods of selling said property and obtaining said
subscriptions.
9. At ~sundry and various times, while plaintiff
was peaceably so engaged in carrying on said business,
by and through his agents and employees, in said Salt
Lake City, the defendants herein, acting by and through
police officers of the defendant municipality, and for
the purpose of 1preventing plaintiff from so soliciting,
by and through his agents and employees, sales of such
subscriptions and sales of such tangible personal property, arrested certain of plaintiff's said agents and employees for alleged violations of said ordinance, and
ordered other of plaintiff's ~said agents and employees
not to make said sales, and threatened to make further
arrests of them, and to prosecute all said agents and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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employees for alleged violations of said ordinance, thereby preventing and threatening to continue to prevent,
plaintiff from rarrying on in the manner aforesaid his
said business in said Salt Lake City, all to :plaintiff'~s
great pecuniary damage and irreparable loss. And
plaintiff avers and charges that said arrests, and said
orders and said threats of further arrests and prosecutions. were made for the purpose of hindering, harassing, impeding, delaying and frustrating, and did hinder,
harass, impede, delay and frustrate the efforts and attempts of plaintiff and his said agents and employees,
in carrying on and conducting plaintiff's said business
in said Salt Lake City; and plaintiff charges and avers
that said arrests, and threatened arrests, and prosecutions, were made by defendants for the purpose of com.pelling plaintiff, and did compel plaintiff, to stop and
abandon the further operation of his said business within
the above described portions of Salt Lake City, Utah.
10. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are,
and will be, violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I
of the Constitution of Utah, and of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, in that, said ordinance, not being regulatory,
is arbitrary and oppressive, and is an outright prohibition of lawful business and of the right of plaintiff to
engage in a lawful business.
11. By their said acts, the defendants, in violation
of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I of the Constitution
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Utah, and of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, have denied
to plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws in the
manner following, to-wit:
(1) Many persons other than plaintiff and other
than plaintiff's agents and employees have, on numerous occasions, violated with impunity the provisions of
said ordinance in that they have on the public streets
and sidewalks of ~said City, doorways and entranceways
immediately abutting thereon, solicited, and are continuing to solicit, the sale, to persons on said 1places of
subscriptions to magazines and periodicals for future
delivery, goods, wares and merchandise, and have sold,
and are continuing to sell, to persons on such places
tangible personal property, goods, wares and merchandise.
Among the magazines, periodicals , and tangible
personal property so sold and 'SO solicited for sale by
such other persons are the following:
(a) Magazines known as ''Consolation" and
"Watchtower", ;published and circulated by a cult known
known as ''Jehovah's Witnesses'';
(b) Coupons entitling persons of whom a photograph had been taken, to have delivered to him or her,
as the case may be, the photograph of himself or herself, as the case may be ;
(c) Coupons entitling purchasers to sightseeing
tours of Salt Lake City and other places in the state
of Utah.
None of said other persons who have so violated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the provisions of said ordinance have ever been arrested
or prosecuted, or in anywise molested by defendants,
or by either of then1, or by any of the agents or representatiYes of defendants, or of either defendant, or by
any of the police officers of said Salt Lake City.
(3) Defendants, their agents and representatives,
and police officers of said Salt Lake City who act under
the authority of said defendant Chief of Police, have
at all times had notice and knowledge of said violations
of said ordinance by said third parties as aforesaid,
and, possessing such notice and knowledge, defendants,
their agents and representatives, and said police officers, with intent to discriminate against plaintiffs and
plaintiff's said business, have at all times deliberately
refrained from enforcing said ordinance as against said
third party violators thereof.
12. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are,
and will be violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and of the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States in that said ordinance bars, in the manner alleged,
the distribution and dissemination of said publications
and thereby prevents the exercise by the publishers and
plaintiff of their constitutional rights of the freedom
of press and the freedom of speech.
13. Plain tiff is advised by his counsel, and now
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and will be, violative of Sections 15 and 24 of Article I
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and of the
''Equal protection clause'' of Section I of said Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States in that, without any reasonable basis therefor,
said ordinance, which when read together with Section
3647 of the s~id Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah, excluding "newspaper" boys from the class identified as "hawkers", makes an arbitrary classification
as between that class of persons who solicit the sale
of s:ubscriptions and tangible personal property and
that class of persons who solicit the sale of newspapers,
thereby arbitrarily discriminating in favor of those who
sell newspapers and against those who sell magazines,
with the result that there is granted to the class which
sells newspapers a privilege from which those who sell
magazines,are arbitrarily excluded.
14. Plaintiff is advised by his counsel, and now
avers, that said ordinance is, and that all the aforesaid
acts and threatened acts of defendants thereunder are,
and will be, violative of the ''commerce clause'' of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States, in that said acts do, and will, materially burden
and interfere with the free flow of legitimate interstate
commerce, by preventing plaintiff from obtaining subscriptions for magazines to be sent from other states
and from being filled by sending into Utah the publications which are published in the other states, and by
preventing plaintiff from obtaining other of said subscriptions for magazines to be sent to other states and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from being filled by sending into the other states the
publications which are published in Utah.
15. Plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law and he files this, his complaint, as a complaint
and affidavit for the purpose of securing a temporary
restraining order and temporary and permanent injunction against the defendants. The defendants will,
unless restrained by this court, enforce the said ordinance against :plaintiff and his said agents and representatives and will thereby injure and destroy the plaintiff's said property and property rights, and cause them
material and irreparable loss, and plaintiff will be unable to conduct their said business in Salt Lake City.
The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest
and costs, many thousands of dollars. The value of the
right of plaintiff to carry on his said business, free
from the harrassing and unlawful acts threatened by
defendants as alleged hereinbefore, exceeds many thousands of dollars. Moreover, unless defendants be restrained from committing the acts which they are threatening to commit, as alleged hereinbefore, there is imminent danger that said agents and representatives will
leave the service of plaintiff and plaintiff will be unable
to obtain replacements, for fear of and in distress over
said acts of defendants, and plaintiff's said business in
Salt Lake City, which is and has been over a long period
of time a very substantial portion of plaintiff's total
business, will be totally destroyed, all to ~Jaintiff's
great and irreparable injury and damage. Plaintiff
avers that the relief requested herein is absolutely neeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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essary for the protection of plaintiffs, his agents and
representatives, against the wanton further molestation by the said defendants.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays:
1. That an order issue out of this court, enjoining
and restraining the defendants, their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys, from interfering
with or molesting plaintiff, his agents, representatives
in connection with the soliciting by them, or by any of
them, of the sales of subscriptions to magazines or
periodicals for future delivery, or the sales by them, or
by any of them, of any tangible personal property to
be delivered at a subsequent time or immediately.
2. For a preliminary and final injunction, enjoining and restraining defendants, their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys, from interfering with
or molesting, plaintiff, his agents, servants and employees in connection with the soliciting by them, or by
any of them, of the sales of subscriptions to magazines
or periodicals or the sales by them or any of them, of
any tangible personal property to be delivered immediately or at a subsequent time.
3. For such other and further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper.

ROBERT S. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S CASE
Section 3652 of the ReYised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1944, provides that peddlers of certain articles
must obtain licenses before selling or offering to sell
their wares in the city of Salt Lake. It also provides
that peddlers of some of those articles may not sell or
offer to sell their articles at all within a certain defined
business district of the city. The general provision requiring licenses covers those who sell any tickets, coupons or receipts representing value or redeemable in
service, photographs, works of art, magazine subscriptions and any goods, wares and merchandise. The latter
provision prohibits in the business district the sale only
of magazine subscriptions and goods, wares and merchandise. Appellant's contention at the outset is that
it is unconstitutional for the city to attempt to prohibit
conversations on the public streets notwithstanding
those conversations partake of a business nature, for
the reason that it is a denial of the right of free speech,
and that forbidding the sale of magazine subscriptions
is not only a denial of the freedom of speech and press,
but also an interference with interstate commerce, inasmuch as the magazines are to be shipped either from
without the state of Utah to purchasers in the state or
from the state of Utah to purchasers outside of Utah.
If this section is justified it must be for the reason
that it is a reasonable prohibition for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, comfort, morals or general welfare of the public. The only purpose, conceivable to appellant, for which the prohibition in this secSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion was adopted is to promote the general welfare by
assuring the free flow of pedestrian traffic on the sidewalks of the business district. Appellant concedes that
the erection of a stand on the public sidewalk or the
stopping of a cart from which articles are sold or distributed would be an interference with traffic, which
may be :prohibited to promote the general welfare. But
appellant contends that it is not necessary to the free
flow of traffic to prohibit the activities of moving peddlers regardless of what they are selling; that it is not
of sufficient importance to the general welfare of the
public to restrict certain citizens in their freedom of
speech and press, and to interfere with interstate commerce.
Further, appellant contends that as the sections of
the ordinances appear on their face there is an unreasonable discrimination in the differentiation between
solicitatio~ of magazine subscriptions and the sale of
newspapers, tickets, coupons and receipts. The differentiation bears no reasonable relation to the problem
of traffic control.
Should the court hold that the ordinance on its face
is valid for the reason that the intention of the Board
of Commissioners in adopting said ordinance was to
prohibit peddling of any kind whatsover on the streets
of the business district, then appellant contends that
the intentional discrimination in the enforcement of the
ordinance on the part of respondents against appellant,
his agents, re,presentatives and employees, in favor of
salesmen of tickets for sightseeing tours, photograph
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

coupons, receipts, ice rremn, ''poppies,''· rodeo tickets,
etc., is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
of the law, and should be enjoined.
This argument is advanced under four points.

POINTS OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
I. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1944, is an infringement of the inherent and inalienable right to communicate freely thoughts and opinions
and abridges and restrains the freedom of speech and of
the press.
II. Section 3652, supra, is a burden upon interstate
commerce in contravention of the Constitution in that
it prohibits the free flow of goods between the states
and limits the area within which goods may flow.
III. Section 3652, supra, is void because it is arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by any reason, logic,
lawful classification or legitimate objective.
IV. Assuming that Section 3652, supra, is valid on
its face. then the discriminatory enforcement of the
ordinance is unlawful and should be enjoined.
I. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
1944, is an infringment of the inherent and inalienable

right to communicate freely thoughts and opinions and
abridges and restrains the freedom of speech and of the
press.

Amendment I to the Constitution of the United
States provides:
''Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
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The freedom of speech and of the press secured
by the First Amendment against abridgment by the
United States is similarly secured to all persons by the
Fourteenth against abridgment by a state. Schneider
v. State (1939), 308 U. S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 144, 60 S. Ct.
146; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652; Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357; Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S.
233; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444.
Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
''All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties;
to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances ;
to communicate freely their thoughts and o:p.inions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."
Article I, Section 15, provides, inter alia :
''No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press ... ''
The inherent and inalienable right to enjoy freedom of s.peech and freedom of the press have been
'secured by the constitutions of the United States and
of the State of Utah.
One of the questions posed by this case is, have the
rights secured by the constitution been abridged by this
ordinance?
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.A n1unicipality may enact regulations in the interest of the morals, public safety, health, welfare or convenience, however, these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitutions to those who
wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or
opinion. Municipal authorities have the duty to keep
their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary pur:pose to
which the streets are dedicated. Schneider v. State,
supra.

Freedom of speech and that of the press are fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not
an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the
belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise
of the rights lies at the foundation of free government
of free men. It stresses the importance of preventing
the restrictions of the enjoyment of these liberties.
Where legislative abridgment of these rights is
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. To the courts is
assigned the difficult task to weigh the circumstances
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. Schneider v. State, supra.
A municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution,
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without a permit, of ''circulars, handbooks, advertising,
or literature of any kind, whether said articles are
being delivered free, or whether same are being sold,''
was held to be invalid on its face, as infringing the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press. Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949. In that case Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, stated:
''Freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringment by Congress, are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties
which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action ... It is also
well settled that municipal ordinances adopted
under state authority constitute state action and
are within the prohibition of the amendment ...
The ordinance is not limited to 'literature' that
is obscene or offensive to public morals or that
advocates unlawful conduct . . . The ordinance
embraces 'literature' in the widest sense. The
ordinance is comprehensive with respect to the
method of distribution. It covers every sort of
circulation, 'either by hand or otherwise.' There
is thus no restriction in its application with respect to time or place. It is not limited to ways
which might be regarded as inconsistent with the
maintenance of public order, or as involving disorderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of the streets.
The ordinance prohibits the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and
in any manner without a permit from the city
manager . . Whatever the motive which induced
its adoption, its character is such that it strikes
at the very foundation of the freedom of the
press by subjecting it to license and censorship.
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·'The liberty of the press is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . The ;press in
its historic connotation comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.
"The ordinance cannot be saved because it
relates to distribution and not to publication.
Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing;''
The nature of the matter, so long as it be not objectionable upon fundamental grounds, makes little or no
difference as it is obvious that the effect of the distribution of handbills, dodgers, newspapers or magazines
on the streets will be substantially the same whether
they contain printed matter of a commercial nature or
political or religious matter. Schneider v. State, supra.
See also Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383.
The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in the
case of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E., 2d 905,
in attempting to sustain an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of magazines within the loop district, stated that
because Rhine was "carrying out a private commercial
enterprise for personal profit; and that the ordinance
was limited to the congested part of the city and was
general in character'' the ordinance might be sustained.
Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United States, save Mr. Justice Reynolds,
stated:
''The streets are natural and proper places
for the dissemination of information and opinion;
and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty
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of expression in appropriate :places abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.''
The same Illinois Supreme Court held that a city
has no authority to require book canvassers who solicit
subscriptions for books for future delivery to obtain a
license, since such canvassers are neither hawkers nor
peddlers. Emmons v. City of Lewiston, 132 Ill. 380,
24 N. E. 58; and see Village of Ceno Gorch v. Rawlings,
135 Ill. 36, 25 N. E. 1006.
The rights granted by the constitution not only
guarantee the right of speech and to write, but also to
make known that which is not limited to a person's own
writing. South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N. E.
2d 868.
In the case of McKay Jewelers v. Bowron (1942),
19 Cal. 2d 595; 122 P. 2d 543, the California Supreme
Court found an ordinance prohibiting solicitations from
doorways and entrance ways of passersby on the street
unconstitutional as not necessary to the general welfare
with the comment that it is conceivable that some hypersensitive individuals may find this type of solicitation
offensive but that it is not sufficient to justify the pro·hibition of an otherwise lawful method of conducting
a business.
The right to conduct a private business free from
unreasonable regulation is just as sacred as the right
of the members of a labor organization to conduct a
campaign for better labor conditions, and should receive
equal protection under the constitutional guarantees.
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To permit peaceful solicitation by a picket on the sidewalk and prohibit 1p€aceful solicitation from a doorway
abutting on the sidewalk would be gross discrimination.
In summation, it might be stated, that the basis for
the ordinance might be for the morals, health, safety,
convenience, or general welfare of the public. No contention is made that such sales of subscriptions to magazines have any relation to the health or morals of the
community. As to the safety, the courts have found
that if the purpose be to prevent fraud by taking payment in advance, other methods of protection are available to the city fathers and the infringements upon
these sacred constitutional rights should not be so
abridged. Schneider v. State, supra. If the purpose
be to prevent the littering of the streets, such a situation
may be avoided by means other than this infringement.
In the cited case, the court stated that "the public
convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does
not justify an exertion of the police ;power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution.'' See Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83
L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954. The case of McKay Jewelers
v. Bowron, supra, states specifically that the fact one
might not desire to be solicited on the streets did not
provide a constitutional basis for an ordinance prohibiting the same and that solicitations on the streets
are sanctioned and recognized by the courts. There is
no evidence in the case at bar that the streets are congested and warrant such legislation and the complaint
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specifically alleges that traffic 1s not hindered in its
free flow. The instant case forms no basis for the infringement of the constitutional rights of appellant so
as to deprive him and his agents, employees and representatives of freedom of speech and of the press.
''Ordinances absolutely prohibiting the exercise of the rights to disseminate information are,
a fortiori, invalid.'' Jones v. Opelika, Bowden
v. Fort Smith, Jobin v. Arizona, 316 U. S. 584.
II. Section 3652, supra, is a burden upon interstate
commerce in contravention of the Constitution in that it
prohibits the free flow of goods between the states and
limits the area within which goods may flow.

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the
United States provides, inter alia:
''The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States: ... "
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes ; ... ''
The articles, namely magazines, being sold are :publications originating outside of the State of Utah in
the main. The publications are being sold by agents
from outside the State of Utah.
The appellant
is not a resident of the State of Utah. The orders obtained are sent outside the State of Utah for fulfillment.
The articles purchased are mailed into the State of Utah
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to the purchasers. There is no contention that the business is in any manner not a legitin1ate business eonducted in accordance with proper morals and ethics.
~-\..n ordinance of Alexandria, Louisiana, provided
that a canvasser n1ust be licensed to solicit sales within
the city. Agents of the Pictorial Review Company were
arrested because they had failed to obtain a license
prior to soliciting magazine subscriptions in the city.
In pictorial Review Co. v. City of Alexandria, (1930)
46 Fed. 2d 337, the Federal District Court held that:
''Although the city undoubtedly had the
right to protect citizens from imposition by ;persons who might violate its police regulations intended for protection of property, morals, health,
and safety, where the nature of business was inherently dangerous, it was established that the
business, being that of publishing of magazines
for which subscriptions were taken, was harmless
and legitimate traffic in interstate commerce.''
The city of Portland, Oregon, enacted an ordinance
requiring the purchase of a license and payment of a
fee therefor by peddlers or solicitors canvassing from
door to door. Hosiery salesmen were selling hose for
future delivery and collecting a down payment. After
the payment was made the order was sent to the home
office. The corporation was an Illinois corporation. The
hosiery were manufactured in Indiana. The home office· shipped the hosiery to the purchaser C. 0. D. on the
balance due. The Supreme Court of the United States
determined, upon the constitutionality of the ordinance
being challenged, that :
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"The ordinance materially burdens interstate commerce and conflicts with the Commerce
clause.'' Real Silk Hosiery Mills. v. City of Portland etal, 268 U. S. 315.
A city ordinance prohibited solicitors, peddlers and
agents going to houses having the sign "No peddlers"
upon them in order to make sales. Salesmen for Real
Silk Hosiery Mills, operating as set forth in the previous
paragraph in the city of Richmond, California, were
charged with violating said ordinance. The United
States District Court found that the ordinance was a
'burden upon the interstate commerce as it enlarged the
group of individuals who were prohibited from approaching such houses to more than peddlers. Real
Silk Hosiery Mills v. Richmond, California, 298 Fed.
126. See Nippert v. Richmond, 90 L. Ed, 496, 66 S.
Ct. 586.
In the case at bar, the agent is prohibited from
soliciting business within a large section of the city
by this ordinance and therefore such restriction limits
the free flow of business between the states and that
.area and is a burden upon interstate commerce.
III. Section 3652, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1944, is void because it is arbitrary capricious, and
not supported by any reason, logic, lawful classification or
legitimate objective.
The complaint alleges that Section 3652, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944, particularly when
read together with Section 3647 thereof, makes an abbitrary classification as between that class of persons
who solicit the sale of magazine subscriptions,
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goods, wares and merchandise and that class of persons
w·ho solicit the sale of newspapers. In defining Hawkers,
Section 3647 provides that any person selling or offering for sale any article or thing, except newspapers
upon any open or public ground shall be deemed a
hawker. Section 3652 under which appellant, his agents,
representatives and employees were arrested and prosecuted provides that it shall be unlawful for any person under any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer
for sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares or
merchandise whatsover on the streets of the defined
business district. This arbitrary classification, it is
submitted, is repugnant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which provides as follows:
"No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within the jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.''
and it is also violative of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, Section 24, Article 1, which requires that
"All lawS'· of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
·
Laws and ordinances of a general nature, which
limit and restirct the liberty of citizens, may be enforced if they are reasonably necessary for the protion, safety, health, morals, comfort or general welSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
fare of the general public. The public power of a
state or municipality, however, must not be exercised
in such a manner as to operate without equal force upon
citizens of the same class. Classification of citizens must
be based upon some real differentiation, and the differentiation must bear resonable relation to the purpose of the law or ordinance.
At the outset it must be determined for what purpose the city fathers saw fit to prohibit sales of magazine subscriptions in the business district of the city.
The purposes for which the ordinance could possibly
have been adopted are five fold, and will be considered in turn.
(1) To guard against the possibility of fraud
arising out of 1paying for a subscription to magazines
for future delivery. Had this been the intention of the
city fathers, it seems that the prohibition would have
been general and not limited to street- solicitation in
'the business district, and the ban would not have extended to ''goods, wares and merchandise'' which can
he delivered right on the street at the time of the sale.
Suppose the ordinance had been general in that it prohibited the sale of magazine subscriptions any place in
the city, and suppose it only covered sales of orders
for future delivery, is the possibility of fraud sufficient reason for such a prohibition 1 Tiedman on Limitation of Police Power, at page 293, has expressed himself on the allied problem of suppression of the ticket
brokerage business as follows :
"It is not contended that the business of
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ticket brokerage is in itself of a fraudlent character. The business can be honestly conducted by
honest men. It is only claimed that in its prosecution the business presents manifold opportunities for the commission of fraud. If that were
a justifiable ground for abolishing any business,
many important, perhaps some of the most beneficial employments and professions could be
properly prohibited. There is no profession or
employment that furnishes more abundant opportunities for the ;practice of frauds upon defenseless victims than does the profession of law. But
it would be idle to assert that because of the frequency of fraudulent practices among lawyers,
the state could abolish the profession and forbid
the practice of law. There is no difference in
principle between the two cases.''
and in Niger v. Van Dell (1914), 85 Misc. 92, 146 N.Y.S.
992, 144 A.L.R. 1347, a statute making it unlawful for
officers of a club or association to solicit members as
a measure in prevention of fraud was held discriminatory and invalid. The court said:
"It is not legitimate legislation to prohibit
the prosecution of a lawful business or calling
because some unscrupulous persons may, in connection with it, perpetrate fraud. The thing to
do is to prohibit and punish the fraud.''
(2) To protect the property owner and taxpayer
who conducts his business upon his own private property from competition of peddlers and hawkers. Here
again the objection to such competition would apply to
peddlers operating in the less congested districts, and
there would be no reason for limiting the prohibition
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to the business district. Furthermore, protection from
competition is not a valid basis for such prohibition
against peddlers and hawkers, for from time immemorial the streets have been used and are intended to be
used by the public which includes peddlers and vendors
in the conduct of their business. In the case of Good
Humor Corporation v. New York City (1943), 290 N.Y.
312, 49 N. E. (2d) 153, the plaintiff which engaged in
the business of selling ice cream products from push
·carts on the streets of New York City was granted an
injunction restraining the enforcement of a Local Law
prohibiting itinerant peddlers on the streets of the city.
The Local Law had been adopted for the express purpose of protecting those who pay rent and taxes from
competition by itinerant peddlers. Mr. Justice Cardoza,
speaking for the Court condemned the action of the
dty in the following words:
''Peddling merchandise upon streets and
highways is a lawful vocation recognized and
regulated by general statutes adopted from time
to time by the Legislature. Though streets and
highways are intended ;primarily for the use of
pedestrians and vehicles travelling upon them,
the vending of merchandise by persons who
have no fixed place of business and who carry
their merchandise in vehicles or on their persons
and who seek customers from those passing. along
the streets is a common and traditional use of the
streets. The right to use a street by any person
even for traveling 'must be exercised in a mode
consistent with the equal rights of others to use
the highway'. (People v. Rosenheimer 209 N. Y.
115, 120). Any use of the streets, and certainly
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an~ use of the streets for a private business pu'rpose, which interferes unduly with the use of the
streets by others for travel, may doubtless be
prohibited, in a proper case, by the legislature.
We need not now pause to define the exact limits
of the legislative power of a city to ado.pt local
laws 'in relation to the care, managment and
use of the streets'. Certainly that power is not
broad enough to prohibit use of the street for
a lawful business, recognized by statute, for the
sole purpose of protecting rent payers and taxpayers against competition from others who do
not pay rent or taxes. The object of the Local
Law as declared in the report of the Committee
on general welfare is not an object which a city
has constitutional power to make effective.''

He further asserted that to prohibit all street !peddlers, and cause complete prohibition, where regulation
or prohibition of only the undesirable peddlers was possible, would be unreasonable, especially where discrimination would not be impracticable. This principal of
law has been recognized in other New York cases where
an ordinance prohibiting street sales in a certain area
of the city was struck down as discriminatory. People
v. Klinge, 276 N. Y. 292; see also People v. Cohen, 272
N. Y. 319. Another city ordinance prohibiting the sale
of ice cream was held unconstitutional because it bore
no real and substantial relation to the health, safety or
general welfare of the public. Schul v. King, (1946),
(Ohio) 70 N. E. 2d 378.
See also People v. Friedman (1940), 16 N. Y. S.
2d 925, at 1page 929, in which the court says that peddling and hawking are lawful uses of the street.
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(3) To protect the public from the distribution of
obscene or lewd literature. Here again the danger would
be just as potential as a result of sales on streets outside of the restricted area, and therefore it cannot be
contended that the ordinance was passed for this purpose.
(4) To promote the general welfare by preventing
uninvited conversation with strangers. If this is what
the city fathers had in mind, it is difficult to understand again why the prohibition is applicable only to
the business district. In disposing of the argument that
prohibition of solicitation from doorways of passersby
on the sidewalk was justified under the general welfare clause, as heretofore stated, the court in McKay
Jewelers v. Bowron, supra, at page 547 of 122 Pac. 2d,
said:
''It is conceivable that some hypersensitive
individuals may find this type of solicitation offensive. However, that is not sufficient to justify the prohibition of an otherwise lawful method
of conducting a business.''
( 5) To 1prevent congestion of traffic. By the process of elimination, then, the conclusion must be reached
that the principal reason for prohibiting the solicitation
for magazine subscriptions in the business district is
to prevent congestion of traffic. To the extent that it
is reasonably necessary for the safety and general welfare of the citizens using the streets regulation of traffic is a valid exercise of the police power. However, to
prohibit certain activities ·merely on the pretext that
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such prohibition is for the safety and general welfare
of the public, when, in fact, there is no reasonable relation between the actiYity prohibited and the safety and
general welfare of the public, is not a justifiable use of
the police power, but is an unconstitutional encroachment
upon the liberty of the persons restricted. In Pittman
v. Nix (1943), 152 Fla. 378, 11 So. 2d 791, 144 A. L. R.
1341, the court, in holding invalid an ordinance which
prohibited solicitation on the streets of labor union members, said:
"It is impossible to conceive that this single
act of soliciting a man on the street, or in a .public
park for that matter, to join a labor union and
pay a membership fee therein, could in any way
prevent the free use of the street, the sidewalks
or any other public place in the city by the general public. And in considering the validity of
ordinances of this general nature, we must not
forget that the liberty guaranteed to us by Section 13 of our Declaration of Rights includes
freedom of speech and of the press.''
The United States Supreme Court, as stated above,
In its recent decision in Schneider v. State, supra, in
striking down municipal ordinances of four different
American cities had the following to say about a ''handbill'' ordinance adopted for the purpose of keeping the
streets clean :
"As we have pointed out the public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets
does not justify an exertion of the police power
which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the constitution.''
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For the same reason the city of Salt Lake shouldn't
prohibit a lawful activity, that of soliciting magazine
subscriptions, merely for the public convenience of having free flow of traffic. Smooth flow of traffic may
be obtained by an ordinance prohibiting the actual stop1ping and blocking of numbers of persons on the sidewalks, but not by an ordinance prohibiting a lawful
activity because it might tend to block traffic in isolated cases.
Paragraph 1 of Section 3652 of the Ordinances
makes it unlawful to offer for sale, without obtaining
a license, any tickets, coupons or receipts representing
value, or redeemable in service, photographs, works of
art, and magazine subscriptions in addition to goods,
wares and merchandise. Paragraph 2 then provides that
goods, wares and merchandise, and magazine subscriptions shall not be sold under any circumstances in the
business district. The apparent intention of the board
of commissioners in adopting such ordinance being to
differentiate between magazine subscriptions and those
other items which are not goods, wares and merchandise. In other words, . if the phrase ''goods, wares and
merchandise'' is not intended to include !photographs,
works of art, tickets, coupons or receipts representing
value or redeemable in service, and magazine subscriptions, then all of those things may be sold in the business district except magazine subscriptions. Regarding
the sales of newspapers there is no problem of interpretation because Section 3647 in defining hawkers specifically exempts those who sell newspapers. Paragraph
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12 of Section 3652 states that the provisions of said
section shall not apply to persons peddling butter, eggs,
fruit, Yegetables or poultry raised or produced by themselves so long as they register in the office of the license
assessor in Salt Lake City. Therefore upon careful
reading of the above sections of the ordinance it is discovered that when properly licensed or registered the
following activities may be carried on in the business
district: sale of newspapers, photographs, work of art,
tickets, coupons and receipts representing value, or redeemable in service, and farm produce raised or produced by the person selling; while on the other hand
the following activities, even though licensed, may not
be carried on in the business district : sale of magazine
subscriptions, goods, wares, merchandise and farm
iproducts not produced or raised by the seller. This
interpretation is based upon the premise that ''goods,
wares and merchandise'' as used in paragraph 2 of
Section 3652 does not include tickets, coupons, receipts,
etc.
Definitions in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, are as follows:
Goods: wares; commodities; chattels; in the
English Sale of Goods Act (56 & 57 Viet. c. 71 ;
(1893) goods include all chattels personal other
than things in action and money.
Wares : articles of merchandise ; the sum of
articles of a particular kind or class ; style or class
of manufactures; goods; commodities; merchandise.
Merchandise: the objects of commerce, whatever is usually bought or sold in trade; goods;
wares.
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In the hearing below on the demurrer it was stipulated that the Board of Commissioners granted permission to street photographers to carry on their business on the ground that they were not selling goods,
wares or merchandise, but rather were selling a service
not included in the prohibition of the ordinance, thereby indicating the meaning which said Board of Commissioners intended to give the words ''goods, wares and
merchandise.'' If the sale of a coupon entitling one
to a photograph is a service, then so also is the sale of
a ticket entitling one to a sightseeing tour, and the sale
of a magazine subscriiption services and they should all
be classified together, and distinct from ''goods, wares
and merchandise.''
Section 81-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, and the Uniform Sales Act define the word ''goods'' as follows:
''Goods'' includes all chattels personal, other
than things in action and money. The term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and
things attached to or forming part of the land
which are agreed to be severed before sale or
under the contract of sale.''
Section 3661, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
1944, defines a merchandise broker as one who
''engages in the business of buying, selling
or negotiating for the purchase or sale of meats,
provisions, produce, hay, grain, flour, goods, lumber, wares, merchandise, drugs, medicines, jewelry or precious metals.''
There is no positive statement in any of the definitions above quoted that brings these coupons, tickets,
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receipts, magazine subscriptions, etc., within the meaning of the words ''goods, wares and merchandise.'' In
People Y. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 941, the defendant
who had been arrested for selling on the street a pamphlet entitled ''John L. Lewis Exposed,'' was convicted
of violating an ordinance prohibiting the sale of merchandise on the street without a license. The ordinance
specifically exempted newspapers and magazines from
the prohibition. The reviewing court in reversing the
judgment of conviction held that the pamphlets, as well
as newspapers and magazines, were not included in the
term, ''merchandise.''
If, then, the court is convinced that tickets, coupons,
receipts, etc., are not within the meaning of the words
"goods, wares and merchandise," and that the ordinance makes no prohibition against selling them on the
streets of the business district, while it expressly excludes the sale of orders for magazine subscriptions,
then there is unreasonable discrimination. As regards
the sale of newspapers, the board of commissioners has
clearly differentiated that activity from that of selling
magazine subscriptions. So far as the purpose of relieving the sidewalks of traffic congestion is concerned,
is there any reasonable basis for such differentiation~
For purposes of classifying mail matter, newspapers and
other periodical publications which are issued at stated
intervals are classified together as second class mail.
Federal Code Annotated, Vol. 9A, Title 39, Section 224.
The National Encyclo1pedia defines "newspaper" as
''A publication containing chiefly news of
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current events, feature articles and advertising,
and issued at fixed periods."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines newspapers as
''Papers conveying news, printed and distributed periodically.''
The State of Utah has classified editors of newspapers and editors of periodicals together in Section
48:0-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in listing those
exempt from jury service. And in regulating the hours
during which children may perform any work, Section
14-6-16 provides that boys over the age of 10 years
may engage in the distribution of newspapers, magazines, periodicals or hand bills on fixed routes in residential districts, thereby indicating the policy of the
state legislature in classification of newspapers and
magazines together in the matter of distribution. Furthermore, in Section 42-3-2 newspapers and periodicals
are classed together in listing the industries required
to be reported upon by the department of publicity and
industrial development to the governor. Also Section
103-38-11 states:
''Any .person who willfully states, conveys,
delivers or transmits, by any means whatsoever,
to the manager, editor, publisher or reporter of
any newspaper, magazine, periodical or serial for
publication therein, any false or libelous statement concerning any person, and thereby secures
actual publication of the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
again indicating the intention of the legislature of the
State of Utah to classify magazines with newspapers,
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all of which indicates that Salt Lake City has gone beyond its constitutional powers in discrin1inating between
the sale of newspapers and magazine subscriptions.
Appellants allege and respondents by demurring
admit that appellant and his agents, employees and representatives conducted their business on the streets
in a very orderly, quiet manner. The question of magazine stands or racks on the sidewalks is not involved.
As a general rule the salesman approaches just one
person at a time and invites a converS'ation. If the
prospective customer indicates that he doesn't wish to
stop for a conversation, the solicitor thanks him and
presses the matter no further. If the person stops and
indicates a willingness to talk to the salesman the latter
suggests that they step back off the middle of the sidewalk, either against the buildings or at the curb between the parking meters in order to keep the way clear
for the pedestrian traffic. The conversation is a direct
solicitation for a magazine subscription and either a
sale is made or the :person solicited goes on his way.
This harmless activity, according to the ordinance, is
unlawful in the business district of Salt Lake City. In
comparison, consider the newsboy of whose methods
judicial knowledge may be taken. He shouts the headlines, and thrusts his paper in front of passersby, and
oftentimes joins one or two others in ganging up on
the same customer at the same time; and yet it is
perfectly legal for him to do so. The methods of the
magazine salesman are more similar to those of the
salesmen of tickets for sightseeing tours. The latter
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approaches the prospective customer and trys to talk
him into purchasing a ticket for one or many of the
various tours provided by his company. Many times a
rather long conversation takes place, and there is just
as much tendency, if any, to block the traffic on the
sidewalk as there is by the magazine salesman. And,
compared with the street !photographer, sofar as blocking traffic is concerned, there is not as much danger
of it from selling a magazine subscription as from the
activities of the street photographer who stands in the
middle of thesidewalk to snap a picture and who stops
his customer for the purpose of selling him a coupon
entitling him to receive the picture when it is developed. Yet the ordinance doesn't prohibit this activity
for the reason that it isn't the sale of "goods, wares
and merchandise.'' All these activities are permitted,
but when it comes to the magazine salesman, the ordidance makes his soliciting upon the streets a criminal
offense. There is no reasonable basis for such discrimination.
The City of Los Angeles atteiil.lpted by a special
ordinance to prohibit photographers from conducting
their business on the streets of the city. The ordinance
made it unlawful to sell any coupon, tickets, receipt or
matter relating to a photograph taken of passersby on
the street. The court in Portnoy v. Hohman (1942), 50
Cal. App. 2d 22, 122 Pac. 2d 533, struck down the ordinance as being discriminitory against street photographers in favor of those selling any other kind of
tickets, such as tickets to ball games, theaters, shows,
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and the distribution of handbills pertaining to these
things. The court said at page 534 of 122 Pac. 2d:
"Upon its face the ordinance sets up an arbitrary and unreasonable classification of persons soliciting sales and distributing advertising matter upon the public streets, not based upon any natural or constitutional difference, and
therefore violates the constitutional guaranties
of equal protection of the law against deprivation of .property without due process of law."
Not far afield is the case of Eden vs. People, 161
lli. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, involving a Sunday closing ordinance requiring all barber shops to close their doors
to business on Sunday. The court in striking the ordinance down as discriminatory and a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution said at page 309 of
161 Ill.:
"If the public welfare of the state demands
that all business and all labor of every description, except works of necessity and charity,
should cease on Sunday, the first day of the
week, and that day should be kept as a day of
rest, the legislature has the power to enact a law
requiring all persons· to refrain from their ordinary callings that day. (Cooley's Const. Lim.
725) All will then be placed on a perfect equality,
and no one can complain of an unjust discrimination. But when the legislature undertakes to
single out one class of labor harmless in itself,
and condemns that and that alone, it transcends
its legitimate powers, and its action cannot be
sustained.''
The recent case of Gronlund v. Salt Lake City
(1948) _ _ Utah--, 194 Pac. 2d 464, decided by the
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Utah Supreme Court held a similar Sunday closing
ordinance discriminatory and invalid because it attempted to differentiate between the sale of different
classes of goods as being more of an emergency type
than others, or more necessary to the sustenance of
life. The court pointed out how ridiculous it was to
say that smoking tobacco was necessary and butter was
not. In principle the basis for differentiation between
selling magazine subscriptions and selling newspapers,
tickets, coupons and receipts is just as unreasonable as
the distinctions attempted in the Sunday closing ordinance.
Appellant admits that the use of the street or sidewalk for business purposes is subordinate to the use of
the general public for travel. Many cases hold that
ordinances :prohibiting the placing of goods, wares and
merchandise on the sidewalks, or the placing of a stand,
or the stopping of a wagon or push cart for the purpose of displaying goods, wares, or merchandise are
valid as applied to activities that in fact block the traffic in any way. See Com. v. Ellis (1893), 158 Mass. 555,
33 N. E. 651 (concerning a stationary object) ; State v.
Messonlongitis (1898) 74 Minn. 165, 77 N. W. 29 (prohibiting the exposing of goods on the sidewalks an
unreasonable time) ; Shelton v. Mobile (1857) 30 Ala.
540, 68 Am. Dec. 143 (prohibiting the sale of poultry,
meat, fish and game); Denver v. Girard' (1895), 21 Colo.
447, 42 Pac. 662 (regarding a stand on the street); and
House Wives League v. Indianapolis (1933), 204 Ind.
685, 185 N. E. 511 (pertaining to stands for the sale
of IP·roduce and other articles).
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In State v. Barbelais (1906), 101 Me. 512, 64 Atl.
881, the court in sustaining an ordinance requiring a
permit to carry on a trade or business in a public street,
said:
"It did not mean that one person could not
make a sale of any article to another person on
the street, as a result of private negotiation, but
that it did mean that a person should not offer
articles fou sale to the public in a public manner,
either from a permanent stand or from a cart
pushed or driven along the street.''
Likewise, in People v. Dmytro (1937), 280 Mich. 82,
273 N. W. 40, 111 A. L. R. 128, the court upheld an ordinance prohibiitng ''curb service,'' but recognized the
right of peddlers and hawkers to sell their wares, because they keep moving along the street, and don't stop
in one place and congest traffic. Appellant suggests
that the case of Chicago v. Rhine, supra, relied upon
by the respondents, is in the same class as the last above
cited cases. It appears from the statement of facts in
the report of the court's opinion_ that the defendant was
charged with "exposing for sale, magazines in front
of 22 South Clark Street," indicating that the case involved a stand, cart, or something of a permanent, physical nature from or upon which the defendant was
displaying and selling his magazines.
Appellant also attacks the ordinance in question on
the ground that it completely prohibits the use of the
streets in the business district by solicitors for magazine subscriptions, when the general statutory law from
which the city derives its power merely grants the power
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to regulate. Section 15-8-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
/provides as follows:
''They (Board of Commissioners) may regulate merchandising and sales upon the streets,
side walks and public places.''
The power to regulate does not included the power to
prohibit. So held the Supreme Court of the State of
Florida in Quigg v. State (1922), 93 So. 139, 84 Fla.
164, in striking down an ordinance which prohibited
jitneys on certain streets where the statute gave the
city power to regulate only; the court said:
''Nor does the welfare clause authorize a
prohibition of use when such vehicles are not
shown to be inherently dangerous to those who
travel the streets. Curry v. Osborn, 76 Fla. 39,
79 So. 293, 6 A.L.R. 108. If they are dangerously
operated, that can be remedied by proper regulations, even to the extent of exclusion from use
of the streets for not observing permissible regulations, that may be enforced in the interest of
public safety and convenience.''
In Chicago v. Schultz (1930), 341 Ill 208, 173 N. E.
276, the City of Chicago had passed an ordinance prohibiting the distribution or handing out of handbills,
cards, pictures or advertising matter upon the public
streets. The grants of power to the city hy the state
legislature included the power to regulate the use of its
streets generally, and specifically to prohibit the throwing of offensive matter in the streets, the !POsting of
handbills upon the streets, and the exhibition or carrying of handbills upon the sidewalks. The defendant was
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convicted of distributing handbills, and the reviewing
court in reversing the judgment held that the specific
power to prohibit distribution of handbills vvas not included in the statutory grants. The court at page 277
of 173 N. E. said:
''Therefore if the city has authority to pass
such an ordinance it must be under its power to
regulate streets (clause 9) or under its general
police powers delegated by clause 66, and it must
be a reasonable regulation tending in some degree
toward the prevention of offenses or preservation of .public health, morals, safety or welfare ..
. . Statutes granting power to municipal corporations are strictly construed, and any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existance of the
powers must be resolved against the municipality ... Although this power of regulation has
been conferred upon the city council, the legislature has not specified the precise manner in
which it shall be exercised, and therefore the
reasonableness of the exercise of the power by
the council is open to inquiry by the courts.''
Then the court points out that the ordinance is so
broad that it would prohibit the handing by a person
of his card or picture to another and would even prevent
the sale or distribution of newspapers because they
contained advertising matter. In condemning this type
of prohibition the court said further:
"Laws which attempt to regulate and restain
our conduct in matters of mere indifference,
, without any good end in view, are regulations
destructive of liberty . . . . .The ordinance is not
a reasonable exercise of its police powers. Its
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strict enforcement would unreasonably hamper
persons in the conduct of their affairs.''
Should the prohibition in the case at bar be considered to be a regulation pursuant to the Utah statute
quoted above, it is still subject to the requirement that
it be reasonable. In discussing the power of a city to
restrict hacks, etc., to certain parts of the city, Tiedman on Limitation of the Police Power at page 312 says:
"But the prohibition as to locality must be
reasonable, in order that it may not offend the
constitutional limitations. If the area in which
the prosecution of a useful trade is prohibited
is so extensive that it amounts to a practical prohibition of the trade the regulations will be unconstitutional.''
It is submitted that even though Section 3652 permits solicitation of magazine subscriptions in some parts
of the city, it is still unreasonable since it prohibits
the activity in the only part of the city where it can
be carried on profitably, and, therefore, it practically
amounts to a complete prohibition of the trade.
IV. Assuming that Section 3652, Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City 1944, is valid on its face, then the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance is unlawful and
should be enjoined.

Under this point appellant, for the sake of argument, assumes that Section 3647, exempting newsboys
from that class known .as peddlers and hawkers, is a
valid classification, and that the prohibition of Section
3652 is valid on its face in that it applys to any kind
of sale whatsoever in the business district, and that the
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phrase ''goods, wares and merchandise,'' includes tickets, coupons, receipts, etc. The section then would place
a flat prohibition against any sales whatsoever on the
streets of the business district except the sale of newspapers.
The complaint alleges that in spite of the existence
of Section 3652 and the fact that the resiPondents have
enforced it against appellants and his agents, employees
and representatives, the respondents have consistently
permitted the activities of others in the same class to
sell tickets, coupons, receipts and pamphlets on the
streets of Salt Lake City's business district. It was
admitted below by the respondents in the hearing on
the demurrer that salesmen for local transportation companies without interference by the police or local authorities sell on the busiest corners of the business district tickets or coupons to tourists entitling them to
sightseeing tours of the city or surrounding points of
interest. By sti;pulation, as noted above, it was also
established that the board of commissioners by written
permission has attempted to waive the prohibition of
the section in the case of street photographers so as
to permit them to sell coupons entitling the purchasers
thereof to photographs taken by the photographers
right in the middle of the sidewalk; and that the local
police to not enforce the ordinance against them; yet
there is absolutely no provision in the ordinances whereby the Board of Commissioners reserved to themselves
the right to waive the restriction in favor of anyone
other than owners of abutting property, and these jphoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tographers do not come within that class. Appellant
alleges further that certain persons who call themselves
''Jehovah's Witnesses'' sell a magazine known as the
"Watchtower" on the streets of the business district
without any interference by the police of local authorities. In addition to these activities the court below took
judicial notice of the fact that there have been at various
times ticket offices or stands erected on the streets of
the business district where tickets to rodeos and shows
have been sold to the passing public, also without any
intereference by the police or respondents. Furthermore appellant now asks this court to take judicial notice of the fact that during the summer months ice
cream vendors have with impunity pushed carts up
and down the streets of the business district, sto\I)ped
them temporarily and sold ice cream to passersby. It
is also common knowledge that for many years such
service organizations as the Veterans of Foreign Wars,
and Disabled Veterans have sold ''poppies'' through
volunteer agents on the streets of the business district
with nothing but encouragement from local authorities
and respondents. Yet for some reason unknown to this
appellant as soon as he or his agents, employees and
representatives proceeded to sell magazine subscriptions
on the sidewalks of the business district respondents
saw to it that they were stopped by arresting them and
charging them with the violation of Section 3652. Such
is a flagrant discrimination in the enforcement of the
ordinance.
The decision of the lower court in sustaining the
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den1urrer and dismissing appellant's complaint asking
for a permanent injunction restraining such discriminatory enforcement was that the failure of police officers to apprehend and prosecute one thief is not available as a defense to a prosecution against another thief
that was apprehended and prosecuted. Appellant agrees
that such failure is no defense to a criminal prosecution,
but contends that that is no argument against the
granting of injunctive relief where there is a clear
intentional discrimination on the part of public officials
in the enforcement of a criminal ordinance. In support
of appellant's contention several cases are hereinafter
cited and quoted.
"'\Vade v. City and County of San Francisco (1947),
- - Cal. App. - - , 186 Pac. 2d 181, a case practically
identical with the one at bar, was recently decided by
the California court of appeals. San Francisco had
adopted an ordinance prohibiting solicitation for the
sale of any magazine or periodical for future delivery,
or the sale of any tangible personal property to be
delivered to the purchaser thereof at a subsequent time.
Plaintiff, a solicitor for magazine subscriptions, sought
an injunction against the discriminatory enforcement
of the ordinance. He alleged that others with im;punity
were violating the ordinance, and that the police and
city officials had knowledge of such violations. The
appellate court in reversing the lower court's decision
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, at page 182 of
186, Pac. 2d, said:
''The plaintiffs by these allegations bring
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their case within the principle first announced
in Yick W o. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 156, 6 S. Ct.
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, and recently followed by the
Supreme Court of this state in Brock v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 2d 605, 610, 86 P. 2d 805. The
latest statement of that principle that has come
to our attention is found in Glicker v. Michigan
Liquor Control Commission, 6 Cir., 160 F. 2d
96. The court in that case reviewed the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court on the subject and reiterated the rule that the intentional
and arbitrary discrimination in the enforcement
of a statute fair on its face is a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which entitles the person discriminated against
to relief in the courts.
''Respondents argue that mere lax enforcement of a law or ordinance violates no constitutional rights, This is a correct statement of
the law, but appellants allege more than mere
laxity of enforcement. They plead that the ordinance is enforced against them and no others
'with intent to discriminate against plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' said business.' This brings them
squarely within the rule announced in Glicker
v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission supra;
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 11, 64 S. Ct. 397,
88 L. Ed. 497; and Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352, 38
S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154. In each of those cases
the distinction between mere laxity of enforcement and intentional or purposeful discrimination is recognized and it is held that while mere
laxity of enforcement, although it may result in
the unequal application of the law to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
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equal protection in the constitutional sense, it
is otherwise in the case of deliberate or intentional discriminatory enforcement which is a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by the
constitution. \Yhile we are fully aware that proof
frequently falls short of .pleading appellants by
their pleading have stated a cause of action which
if proved will entitle them to relief and for the
purpose of this appeal respondents by their demurrer have admitted the truth of the pleaded
facts.''
As appears from the above quotation the Wade
case cited and followed the case of Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220, which,
arose out of an ordinance in the City of San Francisco
prohibiting the further use of frame buildings for
steam laundries, except in cases where the board of
commissioners granted a special permit. Petitioners and
all other Chinese laundry operators were denied permits, while the commissioners consistently granted permits to those operators of the caucasian race. The
court at (page 373 of 118 U. S. in directing the lower
court to discharge the prisoners who had been arrested
for violation of the ordinance, denounced the discriminatory enforcement as follows:
"Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the .prohibition of the constitution .... The
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discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the
public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged.''
In Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission
(1947), 6 Cir., 160 Fed. 2d 96, also cited by the Wade
case the court held that the plaintiff who had been consistantly discriminated against by the liquor commission in revoking her license to sell liquor was entitled
to an order directing the defendant commission to renew
her license.
In the case of Hague v. C. I. 0., supra, Jersey
City had adopted an ordina·nce requiring anyone who
intended to conduct a public meeting in any public place
in the city to register with the director of public safety
and obtain a permit so to do from him. Rep·resentatives
of the plaintiff organization applied for a permit which
was denied, while those who championed causes dear to
the hearts of the city fathers were granted permits.
Plaintiff was granted an injunction which enjoined the
defendants from abridging ;plaintiff's right to hold
meetings unless defendants should refuse everybody such
right. The appellate court, in affirming, modified the
decree so as to enjoin the defendants from refusing to
the plaintiff the right to hold meetings regardless of
whether or not others were forbidden.
The lower court in the case at bar in its memorandum decision held that these cases of discrimination
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in the granting and withholding of permits by administrative bodies or officers are not binding on the court
in this case, because here the question of discretion of
some such body or officer is not involved and it is merely
a question of failure on the part of the police officers
of the respondent city to enforce a flat prohibition
equally against all violators. Appellant admits there is
a technical difference between discrimination _on the
part of an administrative officer who has been given
discretion within limits, and discriminati<:>n by a police
officer who has no discretion but is by law supposed to
enforce the law against everybody equally. However,
as a practical matter the result is the same. Appellant
is in just the same disadvantageous position as if the
chief of police had the power by the ordinance to grant
or withhold permits and Without sufficient reason discriminated against appellant by refusing to grant him
a permit. Appellant insists as did the court in the Wade
case that an intentional and purposeful discrimination
as distinguished from mere laxity of enforcement is a
denial of equal protection guaranteed· by the Constititution.
The Wade ·case ·is not alinie. It is supported by the
case of Covington v. Gausepohl (1933), 250 Ky. 323,
62 S. W. 2d 1040. The City of Covington had adopted
an ordinance prohibiting the placing ·of boxes, barrels,
baskets or merchandise upon the sidewalks of the city.
The city enforced the ordinance againsf the plaintiff
and other storekeepers but allowed hucksters and farmers to place with impunity their goods, wares and merSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chandise on the sidewalks while soliciting trade. Upon
suit brought by the plaintiff storkeeper the lower court
issued an order perpetually enjoining the enforcement
of the ordinance. Upon appeal by the city, the appellate court, in sustaining the lower court's decision, modified the injunction as follows :
"Instead of enjoing all enforcement of the
ordinance involved, the court should only have
enjoined the city from making discriminations
in its enforcement, and this injunction is now
so modified and the judgment is affirmed.''
As appears in the opinion the Kentucky court also relies
on the Yick Wo case and after quoting a part of the
opinion quoted above, said:
''The city would be commended for its efforts to keep its sidewalks clear of obstruction if
it acted impartially, but it cannot be allowed to
discriminate. "
Other cases, though not entirely in point, announcing the same general principle that a law enforced in
such a way as to affect a discrimination against a part
of the community or public is unlawful even though
fair on its face, are Dobbins v. Los Angeles (1904), 49
L. Ed. 169, 195 U. S. 233, 25 S. Ct. 18; Clark v. City of
Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 143 Atl. 677; cited by McMillan
on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 2, page 939, note 1;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bosworth ( 1915), 230 Fed.
191, at page 206; and Walker v. City of Birmingham
(1927), 112 So. 823, 216 Ala. 206.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in sustaining the general demurrer, and respondents should be required to disprove
the allegations of the complaint or else be directed to
cease interfering "ith appellant, his agents, representatives and employees and their business.
The action of the respondents in arresting and
threatening to arrest appellant, his agents, representatives and employees is unlawful in that it is in derogation of their rights of freedom of s:p·eech and freedom of
the press, and also for the reason that it is an interference with the free flow of interstate commerce.
Section 3652 of the Ordinances which prohibits appellant's activities in the business district is unconstitutional for the same reasons. Section 3652 especially when
read together with Section 3647 exempting newsboys, is
also invalid for the reason that it makes an unreasonable
discrimination against magazine subscription solicitors
in favor of salesmen of newspapers and all other types
of tickets, coupons, and receipts. And should the Court
hold that Section 3652 is intended to apply to the sale
of all types of tickets, coupons and recei;pts as well as
to the solicitation of magazine subscriptions, then although the section is fair on its face, the intentional
and purposeful discrimination in the enforcement of
said section against appellant and his magazine salesmen in favor of salesmen of "Watchtower," tickets for
sightseeing tours, photograph coupons, receipts, ice
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cream, "poppies "and rodeo tickets is unlawful and
should be enjoined. The case should be remanded for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. RICHARDS and
T. QUENTIN CANNON,
.Attorneys for .AlJ1pellant.
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